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GANG DATABASES:
RACE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
FAILURES OF CONTEMPORARY GANG
POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY
JASMINE JOHNSON†
“We are very confident that once someone is identified as a
gang member, make no mistake—they are a gang member.”1

INTRODUCTION
Similar to many jurisdictions throughout the United States,2
the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) has a gang
database—a criminal intelligence system utilized by the NYPD to
keep track of alleged “gang members” in New York City.3 And
similar to many jurisdictions throughout the United States, the
NYPD’s gang database has been severely criticized.4 Opponents
of the gang database accuse the NYPD of using it as a tool for
racial profiling,5 mass incarceration,6 and mass criminalization of
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1
Olivia Heffernan, ‘We’ve Got One in The Sweep’, APPEAL (July 30, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/weve-got-one-in-the-sweep/ [https://perma.cc/FT3W-59JF] (quoting
Dermot Shea, NYPD’s chief of crime control strategies in 2017).
2
See Gang Related Legislation by Subject: Criminal Intelligence Information
Systems
(Including
Gang
Databases),
NATIONAL
GANG
CENTER,
https://nationalgangcenter.ojp.gov/legislation/intelligenceinformation
[https://perma.cc/5B9B-TJZ4] (last visited June 22, 2021).
3
See, e.g., Michael Scotto, Activists Rally at City Hall to Get NYPD to Erase
Gang Database, SPECTRUM NEWS (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.ny1.com/nyc/allboroughs/news/2019/12/12/activists-rally-at-city-hall-to-get-nypd-to-erase-gangdatabase [https://perma.cc/BB6A-ZUN3].
4
Id.
5
Abuse of Police Discretion Case: NYPD’s “Gang” Policing Tactics, NAACP
LEGAL DEF. FUND (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.naacpldf.org/case-issue/nypds-gangpolicing-tactics/ [https://perma.cc/7LZC-7KX7].
6
TCR Staff, Does NYPD Gang Database Fuel Mass Incarceration?, CRIME
REPORT (Dec. 17, 2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/12/17/nypd-gang-databasefuels-mass-incarceration-report/ [https://perma.cc/ZM9V-LZGF].
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Black and Brown young men in New York City.7 Opponents of
the database also take issue with the NYPD’s lack of
transparency regarding the gang database.8 It is challenging to
identify whether a person is within this database and even more
difficult to be removed from it because individuals do not receive
any notification when they are added.9
The NYPD’s use of a gang database isn’t the first time it has
been accused of racial profiling. Beginning as early as the 19th
Century, the NYPD has been criticized for the correlation
between its policing tactics and race.10 Most notably, in the early
2000s there was an increase in the use of stop and frisk tactics by
the NYPD.11 However, Judge Shira Scheindlin, in Floyd v. City
of New York, found that the NYPD had a “policy of indirect racial
profiling” of Black and Latinx people through stop and frisk and
that the NYPD had been “deliberately indifferent to the
intentionally discriminatory application of stop and frisk . . . .”12
Floyd led to a change in the NYPD’s stop and frisk tactics.
Following the Floyd decision, the number of stops and frisks
conducted by the NYPD decreased significantly.13 By contrast,
the NYPD simultaneously expanded its Gang Division during
this time, even though gangs were not a significant issue in New
York City.14 A gang database poses detrimental risks to those
added because inclusion can lead to being falsely labeled as a
“gang member,”15 “inexplicably harsh charges or excessive
7

Id.
Id.; NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, supra note 5.
9
See infra Section I.C.
10
Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and
Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 459–61 (2000); Stephon Johnson,
New Report Takes Anti-Gang Initiative ‘Operation Crew Cut’ to Task, AMSTERDAM NEWS
(Dec. 12, 2019, 10:13 AM), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2019/dec/12/new-report-takesanti-gang-initiative-operation-cr/ [https://perma.cc/PE8M-GHHY].
11
Michael D. White, The New York City Police Department, its Crime Control
Strategies and Organizational Changes, 1970-2009, 31 JUST. Q. 74, 84 (2014).
12
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
13
Janell Ross, There’s a Lot of Chatter About ‘Stop and Frisk.’ Here Are the Facts.,
WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2016, 7:33 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/10/05/theres-a-lot-of-chatter-about-stop-and-frisk-here-are-the-facts/
[https://perma.cc/NF8G-PHXF] (stating that the NYPD is still permitted to conduct stops
and frisks in New York City, but the number of stops recorded have drastically declined
from 2011 to 2015).
14
K. Babe Howell, Gang Policing: The Post Stop-and-Frisk Justification for
Profile-Based Policing, 5 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015).
15
Madina Toure, NYPD Faces Scrutiny Over How It Determines Who Is a Gang
Member, OBSERVER (June 13, 2018, 2:59 PM), https://observer.com/2018/06/nypdfederal-gang-raids-database/ [https://perma.cc/GP2V-G99T].
8
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bond,”16 and deportation by ICE.17 For these reasons, it is
important that “the right people”18 are placed in a gang database.
Part I of this Note begins with a discussion of Floyd v. City of
New York and the history of stop and frisk in New York City.
The discussion then shifts to the NYPD’s focus on gang-oriented
policing through “Operation Crew Cut” and its gang database.
Part I explains what it means to be in a “gang” in New York City,
the criteria for being placed in the NYPD's gang database, how
its gang database functions in practice, and the racial makeup of
those in its gang database. Part II argues that the NYPD’s gang
database violates the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. The correlation between the gang database's disparate
racial impact and the historical background of racial profiling in
the NYPD helps prove discriminatory intent on the part of the
NYPD. Part III argues that the NYPD’s gang database also
violates the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause. Since the
NYPD provides neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard, the
gang database infringes on the liberty of New Yorkers without
due process of law. Part IV suggests reforms that can be made to
the NYPD’s gang database, largely based on California’s
CalGang legislation, that would fix the constitutional issues
pointed out in this Note.
I.

A HISTORY OF RACIAL PROFILING & THE GANG DATABASE

Gang databases are criminal intelligence systems that track
alleged gang members within the applicable jurisdiction.19 In
October 2012, the NYPD announced “Operation Crew Cut,” a

16
Alice Speri, NYPD Gang Database Can Turn Unsuspecting New Yorkers Into Instant
Felons, INTERCEPT (Dec. 5, 2018, 9:16 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/12/05/nypd-gangdatabase/ [https://perma.cc/B58L-UQPE].
17
Keegan Stephan, Conspiracy: Contemporary Gang Policing and Prosecutions,
40 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1014 (2018).
18
Cf. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(noting that some of the evidence of racial discrimination consisted of the NYPD’s
unwritten policy of targeting “the right people” to stop and frisk—i.e., young Black
and Latinx men).
19
Joshua D. Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 115, 119 (2005); see also Gang Related Legislation by Subject: Criminal
Intelligence Information and Systems (Including Gang Databases), NATIONAL GANG
CENTER, https://nationalgangcenter.ojp.gov/legislation/intelligenceinformation#gangrelated-legislation-by-subject [https://perma.cc/X7LL-HSH8] (last visited June 22,
2021); Keegan Stephan, Conspiracy: Contemporary Gang Policing and Prosecutions,
40 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1014 (2018).
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“war on gangs” across New York City.20
Following the
implementation of Operation Crew Cut, there was an increase in
the use of the NYPD’s “secret” gang database.21 Interestingly,
the NYPD’s shift in focus to gangs in 2012 occurred shortly after
it was forced to change its practice of stop and frisk.22 Therefore,
it is appropriate to begin with the effect that the Floyd decision
had on the NYPD’s use of stop and frisk.
A.

S.D.N.Y. Finds That the NYPD Engages in Racial Profiling
Tactics

“Between January 2004 and June 2012, the NYPD conducted
over 4.4 million Terry stops.”23 Due to allegations of racial
profiling, the constitutionality of the NYPD’s stop and frisk
tactics was brought before the Southern District of New York.24
Floyd focused on data that found 88% of the stops conducted by
the NYPD resulted in no further law enforcement action, such as
an arrest or a summons.25 Additionally, the court found that 83%
of people stopped for Terry stops were either Black or Latinx,26
despite New York City’s population only being 52% Black or
Latinx at the time.27 It also found that weapons were only seized
in 2.1% of the stops where the suspect was Black or Latinx28 and
that contraband was only seized in 3.5% of the stops where the
suspect was Black or Latinx.29

20
Rose Hackman, Is the Online Surveillance of Black Teenagers the New Stopand-Frisk?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/apr/23/online-surveillance-black-teenagers-new-stop-and-frisk
[https://perma.cc/F4QG-3TJ2]; see also Howell, supra note 14, at 2.
21
Howell, supra note 14, at 4; see also Alice Speri, New York Gang Database
Expanded by 70 Percent Under Mayor Bill De Blasio, INTERCEPT (June 11, 2018,
10:49 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/06/11/new-york-gang-database-expandedby-70-percent-under-mayor-bill-de-blasio/ [https://perma.cc/5NAV-FT7Y].
22
See Howell, supra note 14, at 2; Stephon Johnson, Stop-and-Frisk Makes Way
for Operation Crew Cut, AMSTERDAM NEWS (Sept. 26, 2013, 11:32 AM),
http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2013/sep/26/stop-and-frisk-makes-way-operationcrew-cut/ [https://perma.cc/6UL9-LWXP].
23
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558. Terry stops are another name for “stop and
frisk,” named after the case Terry v. Ohio, which held stops and frisks to be
constitutional. Id. at 558, 565.
24
Id. at 556.
25
Id. at 558–59.
26
See id. at 559.
27
See id.
28
See id.
29
See id.
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This pattern of racial targeting led to the filing of a class
action lawsuit against the City of New York in 2008.30 The
plaintiffs in Floyd argued that the NYPD deliberately targeted
young men of color in New York City without any objective
suspicion of criminal behavior.31 The trial lasted two months and
more than 100 witnesses testified.32 The data and the testimony
informed the court’s decision that the NYPD’s Terry stops were
being used as a tool for racial profiling.33 The court ultimately
found that the City was liable for violations of Fourth
Amendment rights34 and Fourteenth Amendment rights.35
Holding that “[w]hether through the use of a facially neutral
policy applied in a discriminatory manner, or through express
racial profiling, targeting young black and Hispanic men for
stops based on the alleged criminal conduct of other young black
or Hispanic men violates bedrock principles of equality,”36 the
court ordered “immediate changes to the NYPD’s policies, a jointremedial process to consider further reforms, and the
appointment of an independent monitor to oversee compliance
with the remedies ordered in this case.”37 This effectively
changed the stop and frisk tactics used by the NYPD.
B.

The NYPD Begins Focusing on Gang-Oriented Policing

Floyd was decided on August 12, 2013,38 just ten months
after the NYPD announced Operation Crew Cut. Like stop and
frisk, New York City’s gang database is operated solely by the

30
Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al., CTR. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/floyd-et-al-v-city-new-york-et-al
[https://perma.cc/2MQ8-B46X] (last modified July 9, 2020).
31
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
32
Id. at 575.
33
The data is referenced in the previous paragraph. The testimony ranged from
victims of the NYPD’s Terry stops practice to NYPD officers. Id. at 573–75.
34
Id. at 658 (“Plaintiffs established the City’s liability for the NYPD’s violation
of their Fourth Amendment rights under two theories, . . . first, plaintiffs showed
that senior officials in the City and at the NYPD were deliberately indifferent to
officers conducting unconstitutional stops and frisks . . . .”).
35
Id. at 661 (“Plaintiffs have established . . . that the City, through the NYPD,
has a policy of indirect racial profiling based on local criminal suspect data. Second,
plaintiffs showed that senior officials . . . have been deliberately indifferent to the
intentionally discriminatory application of stop and frisk . . . .”).
36
Id. at 664.
37
Id. at 667.
38
Id. at 540.
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NYPD.39 The NYPD describes its database as “a necessary tool to
combat criminal organizations.”40 According to the NYPD’s
website, “[s]ince 2014, accuracy and precision of the database has
been improved by tighter standards for entry.”41 However, these
“tighter standards” still leave some room for inaccuracies:
People entered in the database today either have identified
themselves as gang members to a member of the department or
on social media; been named as gang members by two reliable
independent sources, or shown a consistent and repeated
pattern of gang involvement through their affiliations and their
use of colors, signs, tattoos and other indicators. Only gang
detectives or intelligence officers can recommend entries to the
database, and a supervisor must approve the entry.42

It is not clear what constitutes a consistent and repeated
pattern of involvement and what it means for someone to reliably
identify themselves as gang members on social media.
Additionally, there is no requirement of criminal conduct to be
identified as a gang member and being in a gang, in and of itself,
is not currently a crime.43 However, the NYPD does define a
“gang” as:
Any ongoing organization, association or group of three or more
persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its
primary activities, the commission of one or more criminal acts
(including drug dealing), having a common name or common
identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or
collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal
gang activity.44

Thus, the NYPD’s definition of “gang” has a requirement of
criminal activity, but one can be included as a ‘gang member’ in
the NYPD gang database without proof of any such criminality.
Due to this definition of “gang,” being placed in the database
comes with an implication of criminal activity. Additionally, the

39

N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, Chief of Detectives Dermot Shea: Criminal Group
Database is Vital Tool to Controlling Gang Violence (June 13, 2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/s0613/chief-detectives-dermot-shea-criminalgroup-database-vital-tool-controlling-gang-violence [https://perma.cc/9XVJ-9YBB].
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.; see also Howell, supra note 14, at 15–16.
43
See Howell, supra note 14, at 15.
44
NYPD, PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE 212-13: REPORTING GANG RELATED CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY 1 (2020), https://www1.nyc gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/publicpguide2.pdf#page=464 [https://perma.cc/Y3NE-4GSU] (emphasis added).
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lack of a requirement of criminal activity needed to place an
individual in the database can potentially lead to false entries.
The NYPD claims that officers are mandated to routinely
expunge names from the database every three years and “at
important milestone moments” to address the issue of false
entries. 45 It is also claimed that “inclusion in the database is not
considered proof of any crime or grounds for any arrest or other
punitive action. Nor is the information in the database available
outside the NYPD.”46 In practice, however, it appears that these
claims are incorrect.
C.

The NYPD Gang Database Lacks Transparency

The NYPD’s gang database effectively “allows the NYPD to
maintain identifying data, including name, address, and social
security number on individuals without even a pretense of
reasonable suspicion.”47 Moreover, the NYPD is allowed to track
all of this information without satisfying traditional due process
notice requirements.48 The New York Freedom of Information
Law (“FOIL”) does require the NYPD to disclose “all records”
requested by a member of the public unless the NYPD is
protected against disclosure on the matter.49 Under FOIL, an
individual can request the NYPD’s file on him or herself.50
However, at least 350 people who submitted FOIL requests in
regards to their placement in the gang database have had their
requests rejected by the NYPD.51 The NYPD responded, “the

45

N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 39.
Id.
47
Howell, supra note 14, at 15.
48
Procedural Due Process Civil, JUSTIA (“ ‘[A] requirement of due process in any
proceeding . . . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.’ . . . [N]otice must be sufficient to enable the
recipient to determine what is being proposed and what he must do to prevent the
deprivation of his interest.”) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)), https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-14/05procedural-due-process-civil.html [https://perma.cc/S8FS-C2NW] (last visited June
22, 2021).
49
N.Y. PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW § 87(2) (McKinney 2020).
50
Projects, Units & Initiatives: Community Justice Unit, LEGAL AID SOC’Y,
https://www.legalaidnyc.org/programs-projects-units/community-justice-unit/
[https://perma.cc/K8UN-9CJ7] (last updated Mar. 2, 2020).
51
Noah Manskar, NYPD Won’t Tell You If They Think You’re in A Gang: Legal
Aid, PATCH (Apr. 5, 2019, 4:51 PM), https://patch.com/new-york/new-york-city/nypdwont-tell-nyers-if-it-thinks-theyre-gang-legal-aid [https://perma.cc/98RS-96N2].
46
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documents could not be released because the information they
contain would ‘reveal non-routine techniques and procedures.’ ”52
Not only are citizens not entitled to know whether they are
in the database, “[t]here is no . . . procedure for challenging
inclusion in gang databases.”53 The NYPD can track and keep
records of New Yorkers—with no suspicion of criminal activity—
without so much as having to notify these individuals of their
status in the gang database or without so much as having to give
them the opportunity to contest their designation as a gang
member. And despite what has been claimed, there is not a
requirement or provision for purging names from the gang
database as it currently stands.54
D. The Database Has Major Consequences & Racial
Implications
The consequences of being placed into the NYPD’s gang
database should not be taken lightly. The NYPD maintains that
it does not share the information housed in its database with
outside agencies, but that has been proven false in practice.55
The list has been made available to prosecutors.56 This leads to
inexplicably harsh charges, potential sentence enhancements,
potential deportation, and/or excessive bond for individuals who
may not be gang-affiliated at all.57 Being in the gang database
also leads to heightened surveillance by the NYPD, the
possibility of being subjected to one of the NYPD’s gang raids, the
possibility of losing one’s job, and the possibility of being removed
from public housing.58

52

Id. (quoting letter from NYPD).
Howell, supra note 14, at 15.
54
Id. at 16.
55
See JOSMAR TRUJILLO & ALEX S. VITALE, GANG TAKEDOWNS IN THE DE
BLASIO ERA: THE DANGERS OF ‘PRECISION POLICING’, 18–21 (2019),
https://policingandjustice.squarespace.com/s/2019-New-York-City-Gang-PolicingReport-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAQ4-9CYE]; Vaidya Gullapalli, Spotlight: The
Dangers of Gang Databases and Gang Policing, THE APPEAL (July 3, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/spotlight-the-dangers-of-gang-databases-and-gang-policing/
[https://perma.cc/RMA5-XWGT].
56
Speri, supra note 16.
57
Id.; see also Gullapalli, supra note 55.
58
See TRUJILLO & VITALE, supra note 5555, at 13–21. In one case, a Bronx
native who was close to finishing his MBA, and had no prior criminal record, faced
the death penalty. Gullapalli, supra note 55 (describing the misfortune of Kraig
Lewis who was erroneously included in the NYPD’s gang database due to childhood
interactions, and subsequently arrested in one of the NYPD’s gang sweeps).
53
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These consequences are especially significant when
examining who is most affected by the database. The data shows
that the database is demographically skewed.59 As of June 2019,
the NYPD reports that its gang database is 66% Black, 22.4%
White Hispanic, and 9.3% Black Hispanic.60 To put these
numbers in context, as of 2019, it is estimated that 22.03% of
New York City’s population identifies as Black only, 10.68%
identifies as White Hispanic, and 2.29% identifies as Black
Hispanic.61 So, whereas only 35% of New York City’s population
identifies as Black and/or Hispanic, New Yorkers who identify as
Black and/or Hispanic comprise 97.7% of the NYPD’s gang
database.
According to the NYPD, “[t]he racial composition of the
database reflects patterns of gang membership, not police
biases.”62 However, it seems that the database does not
account for all types of “gangs.”63 In general, while gang
involvement is more common amongst Black and Latinx males,
gang involvement is “substantially more common among white
youth than law enforcement statistics estimate, with white
gang members accounting for 25% or more of all gang
members.”64 Additionally, studies have consistently found that
most gang-related murders are committed by white people and,
in general, “white people commit the vast majority of violent
crimes.”65 Therefore the claim that the racial composition of
the database, which is 97.7% people of color, solely reflects
gang membership is likely inaccurate, and it is more likely that
what is truly being reflected is police bias.

59

See Howell, supra note 14, at 17.
Michael Tashji & Niamh McDonnell, New York City Bill That Would Tweak
Gang Database Gets Heated Hearing, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCH. (July 1, 2019),
https://jjie.org/2019/07/01/new-york-city-bill-that-would-tweak-gang-database-getsheated-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/FS87-4QWW].
61
Racial Demographic Estimates for New York City, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork?
[https://perma.cc/7TFTK6DN] (last visited June 22, 2021).
62
See Nick Pinto, NYPD Added Nearly 2,500 New People to Its Gang Database
in
the
Last
Year,
INTERCEPT
(June
28,
2019,
11:15
AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/06/28/nypd-gang-database-additions
[https://perma.cc/HE7E-CWLQ] (summarizing tesimony given by Oleg Chernyavsky,
the head of legislative affairs for the NYPD).
63
The Proud Boys—a white, far-right, self-declared chauvinist group that
identifies as a gang—are not in the database. See id.
64
Howell, supra note 14, at 16.
65
Stephan, supra note 19, at 1016.
60
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With the NYPD facing a trial based on racial profiling and
unconstitutional stops in 2012, the NYPD may have found a
new justification for the intensive policing of young men of
color in New York City.66 With the pretext of gang crime and
the public misconception that “gang membership alone is a
proxy for violent criminality,”67 the NYPD seems to have
developed a policing tactic that is race-based in practice, raceneutral on its face, and “avoids both public and judicial
scrutiny.”68 And, in keeping this database, the NYPD is
depriving many New Yorkers of their procedural rights.
II. THE DATABASE INFRINGES ON EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits, among other things,
intentional race-based discrimination. The Second Circuit has
outlined three ways to prove intentional discrimination that
violates the Equal Protection Clause69: (1) there is a law or policy
that “expressly classifies persons on the basis of race”;70 (2) there
is a facially neutral law or policy that has been applied in an
intentionally discriminatory manner;71 or (3) there is a facially
neutral statute or policy that has an adverse effect and was
motivated by discriminatory animus.72
There is rarely direct proof of discriminatory intent, and,
therefore, courts have allowed circumstantial evidence to prove
discriminatory intent.73 Courts have found that “[t]he impact of
the official action—whether it bears more heavily on one race
than another—may provide an important starting point.”74
Another form of circumstantial evidence that courts have allowed
is the historical background of the actor.75 That is, courts can
consider past racial animus or discrimination conducted by the
66

Howell, supra note 14, at 12.
Id. at 5.
68
Id. at 4.
69
Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000); Floyd v. City of
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 570–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
70
Brown, 221 F.3d at 337; Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
71
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886); Brown, 221 F.3d at 337;
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 570–71.
72
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65
(1977); Brown, 221 F.3d at 337; Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
73
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
74
Id. (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
75
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267 (“The historical background of the decision
is one evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken
for invidious purposes.”).
67
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same actor when analyzing discriminatory intent under the
Equal Protection Clause.76 Using racial impact as the starting
point, this section examines the racial discrepancies present in
the database and the NYPD’s gang policing tactics. After
analyzing the impact, this section concludes by analyzing the
historical background of the NYPD and its practices of racial
targeting.
A.

There Is a Disparate Impact on Communities of Color

Disparate impact refers to the “unnecessary discriminatory
effect on a protected class caused by a practice or policy . . . that
appears to be nondiscriminatory.”77 There are two components to
examine when looking at disparate impact. The first is the data.
The database is demographically skewed, directly effecting Black
and Latinx communities in New York City.78 The second
component is the actual impact. The gang database has a
discriminatory effect on the people in Black and Latinx
communities in New York City.79 Those subjected to the gang
database are subjected to harassment, hyper-policing, enhanced
bail, employment issues, housing issues, and risks of
deportation.80
1.

The Database Is Demographically Skewed

Gang membership has long been associated with racial and
socioeconomic status.81
Specifically, it has been largely
associated with Black and Latinx people.82 It is not merely a
coincidence that, as the Floyd court was deciding whether the
NYPD’s stop & frisk practices had an intentional and
unconstitutional disparate impact on Black and Latinx people,

76
See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 216 (4th Cir.
2016) (noting that the North Carolina legislature requested and received racial data
regarding how citizens vote and subsequently created a bill that targeted many of
the ways that African Americans were found to vote).
77
Disparate
Impact,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/legal/disparate%20impact
[https://perma.cc/4FXW-MA2K]
(last
visited June 22, 2021).
78
See supra Section I.D.
79
TRUJILLO & VITALE, supra note 55, at 6.
80
Id. at 13–21.
81
Frequently Asked Questions About Gangs, NATIONAL GANG CENTER,
https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/about/FAQ [https://perma.cc/23S7-2YF7] (last
visited June 22, 2021).
82
Id.
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the NYPD shifted its focus to surveilling activity largely
associated with Black and Latinx people.
Under Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the fact that the database is
nearly 98% people of color83 is evidence of biased enforcement.84
Yick Wo dealt with an 1880 ordinance in the city of San Francisco
that required all laundries in wooden buildings to hold a permit
issued by the city’s Board of Supervisors.85 The board had total
discretion over who would be issued a permit.86 Although
workers of Chinese descent operated about 75% of the city’s
laundry businesses, only one Chinese owner was granted a
The Supreme Court of the United States then
permit.87
concluded that, despite the impartial wording of the law, the
board’s biased enforcement violated the Equal Protection
Clause.88 According to the Court, even if a law is impartial on its
face, “if it is applied and administered by public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice
is still within the prohibition of the [C]onstitution.”89
The NYPD suggests that the racial breakdown of its
database is proportionate to New York City crime statistics,90 but
this suggestion ignores one of the most glaring issues with the
gang database: there is no requirement of criminal activity.91 A
citizen can be added to the database “for standing on the corner
and wearing a red T-Shirt.”92 It seems counterintuitive, then,
that there should be a correlation with crime statistics when
there are individuals added for non-criminal reasons.
Additionally, if the NYPD is not required to target crime or
criminals to enter someone into the database, and additions to
the database are subject to extreme police discretion,93 then that
raises the question: what is the NYPD targeting? “This practice
of subjecting people to police action based on the same rates as

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See generally Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Id. at 366.
Id.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 373–74.
Id.
Stephan, supra note 19, at 1027.
See Howell, supra note 14, at 15; Stephan, supra note 19, at 1027.
Stephan, supra note 19, at 1027.
Id.
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racially disproportionate criminal suspect data for non-criminal
criteria at the discretion of police is the exact finding” the Floyd
court held violated the Constitution.94
Using non-criminal
criteria to track alleged gang members and, in turn, creating a
database that is nearly 100% Black and Latinx looks like racial
targeting.
2.

The Impact

Being placed in a gang database and labeled as a gang
member does not come without consequences. Those placed in
the gang database are subjected to harassment, hyper-policing,
enhanced bail, employment issues, housing issues, and risks of
deportation.95 While the number of stops in New York City has
decreased since Floyd, street-level contact with police remains
constant in “gang” communities.96 Under Operation Crew Cut,
police have chosen to put more focus on those individuals
"deemed gang-involved."97 More policing can lead to more arrests
and deeper forms of harassment by the police.98
These problems follow these individuals into the courtroom.
Often, allegations of gang affiliation have led to higher bail or
denial of bail.99 The label of “gang member” comes with
perceived notions of criminality and danger.100 It is also thought
to bare on one’s “character, reputation, habits and mental
condition.”101 Due to their placement in the database, individuals
have been fired from their jobs and excluded from public housing,
and the database has also been used as a pretext to initiate
removal proceedings against noncitizens.102 The NYPD’s gang
database directly impacts the lives, both inside and outside of the
criminal justice system, of Black and Latinx people in New York
City in a disparate way.
B.

Historical Background

Disparate impact is not enough to prove an equal protection
violation, there must also be discriminatory intent.
94

Id.; Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 660–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
TRUJILLO & VITALE, supra note 55, at 13–21.
96
See id. at 13–15.
97
Id. at 2, 14.
98
Id. at 13.
99
Id. at 15.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 18–21.
95
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Discriminatory intent may be proven circumstantially through
information such as historical background. What matters for the
purpose of historical background in an equal protection analysis
is the historical background of the actor. Here, the relevant actor
is the NYPD. However, at the onset of this analysis, it is
important to note that the relevant actor being the NYPD
provides an obstacle to the claim. The personnel of the NYPD is
consistently changing with each hiring class and, as result, this
could mean that the NYPD that engaged in racial profiling in the
past may not be the same NYPD engaging in anti-gang policing
tactics today. However, it is relevant that Raymond Walter Kelly
served as the New York City Police Commissioner between
January 1, 2002, and January 1, 2014, under Mayor
Bloomberg.103 Commissioner Kelly headed the NYPD both in the
early 2000s, during the height of stop and frisk in New York City,
and in 2012, when the NYPD announced Operation Crew Cut.104
1.

The NYPD Has A History of Racial Profiling

It is common knowledge that the NYPD has had a difficult
history with policing in Black and Latinx neighborhoods.105
Between 2014 and June 2019, more than 2,000 complaints were
filed against the NYPD for racial profiling.106 The effects of
perceived racial profiling by the NYPD were not only felt by
Black & Latinx citizens unassociated with the NYPD. Racial
profiling is a practice that is systematically embedded within the
NYPD.107 It is both explicit and implicit. The Floyd court found
that during the stop and frisk era, “the City’s highest
officials . . . turned a blind eye” to the racial discrimination
103

Raymond Kelly, UNITED TALENT AGENCY (Jan. 8, 2020, 8:18 AM),
https://www.unitedtalent.com/speaker/raymondkelly/ [https://perma.cc/5U9J-HM5N];
NYPD Historical and Current Research: Police Commissioners, LLOYD SEALY LIBRARY
(July 27, 2020, 11:29 AM), https://guides.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/nypd/Commissioners
[https://perma.cc/8CPQ-3894].
104
Johnson, supra note 10.
105
Debbie Almontaser, The NYPD’s Ugly History of Racial Profiling, GUARDIAN (Jan.
30, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/jan/30/nypd-uglyhistory-racial-profiling [https://perma.cc/Z45D-5T3R].
106
Cindy Rodriguez & WNYC Staff, Nearly 2,000 Complaints of NYPD Racial
Profiling Since 2014–And the Department Found Nothing Wrong, GOTHAMIST (June
26, 2019, 10:37 AM), https://gothamist.com/news/nearly-2000-complaints-of-nypdracial-profiling-since-2014mdashand-the-department-found-nothing-wrong
[https://perma.cc/RF5H-QS8Y].
107
See Conor Friedersdorf, The NYPD Officers Who See Racial Bias in the NYPD,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/01/thenypd-officers-who-see-racial-bias-in-the-nypd/384106/ [https://perma.cc/PTQ8-3KPD].
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occurring in conjunction with stop and frisk.108 “In their zeal to
defend a policy that they believe to be effective, they . . . willfully
ignored overwhelming proof that the policy of targeting ‘the right
people’ is racially discriminatory . . . .”109 These biases and
prejudices still exist within the NYPD today.110
2.

There Are Similarities Between Stop and Frisks and
Operation Crew Cut

Critics of the NYPD’s gang database have highlighted the
similarities between the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices and the
The most notable similarities are the racial
database.111
discrepancies and the disproportionate effects that the practices
have on communities of color. Under stop and frisk, out of the
4.4 million stops made by the NYPD between January 2004 and
June 2012, eighty-three percent of the people stopped were either
Black and/or Latinx;112 at the time, New York City’s population
was only fifty-two percent Black and/or Latinx.113 The Floyd
court also noted that the NYPD’s practice of stop and frisk led to
community resentment towards the NYPD, particularly within
communities of color.114 It took a toll on those stopped.115 People
of color often felt singled out by the police, even though most of
them had done notthing to attract police attention.116 And
communities of color felt alienated by the police.117 The data and
the effects played a significant part in the court finding that the
NYPD “has a policy of indirect racial profiling”118 and “that senior
officials . . . have been deliberately indifferent to the intentionally
discriminatory application of stop and frisk . . . .”119

108

Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id.
110
See, e.g., Ali Watkins, 2,495 Reports of Police Bias. Not One Was Deemed Valid by the
N.Y.P.D., N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/nyregion/nypdbias.html [https://perma.cc/T5PZ-L8F9].
111
Jeff Coltin, Why Everyone Is Suddenly Talking About the NYPD Gang Database, CITY
& STATE N.Y. (June 13, 2018), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/policy/criminaljustice/why-everyone-suddenly-talking-about-nypd-gang-database.html
[https://perma.cc/NE9J-G9K3].
112
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 556–57.
115
Id. at 557.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 660.
119
Id.
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Under Operation Crew Cut, the gang database has risen to
18,084 people by June 2019120—nearly 98% of them being Black
and/or Latinx.121 Similar to stop and frisk, there is a public
concern that some communities—communities of color—are
surveilled more than others.122 The gang database has been
criticized by civil rights activists for disproportionately targeting
Black and Latinx youth.123 Many have referred to the gang
database as the “successor to the much-maligned practice of stopand-frisk.”124 The NYPD has faced public backlash over its
“inaccurate labeling of youth—especially youth of color—as gang
members . . . .”125
There has additionally been a focus placed on the effects of
the gang database on communities of color. Citizens are being
incriminated “simply because they were wearing the wrong color,
living in a ‘bad area’ or were hanging out with their friends ‘on
the wrong corner.’ ”126 Like with stop and frisk, the gang
database and its effects are causing communities of color to feel
alienated by the police.127 The lawful conduct of New York City
citizens can result in unwanted attention from the authorities,
and being falsely labeled as a gang member can have serious
consequences.128 The NYPD’s history of racial profiling, the
similarities between the effects of stop and frisk and the gang
database, and the temporal proximity between Floyd and
Operation Crew Cut suggests that there is some discriminatory
intent in the maintenance of the NYPD’s gang database.
III. THE NYPD’S GANG DATABASE VIOLATES
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The basic procedural requirements courts provide to an
individual to avoid a deprivation of rights are notice and the

120

Pinto, supra note 62.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
122
Pinto, supra note 62.
123
Coltin, supra note 111.
124
Id.
125
Toure, supra note 15.
126
Id. (quoting Queens Councilman Donovan Richards, chairman of the New
York City Council’s Committee on Public Safety).
127
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also
Hazel Sanchez, Critics, Community Leaders Question Use of NYPD’s Gang Database,
CBS N.Y. (June 13, 2018), https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2018/06/13/nypd-gangdatabase/ [https://perma.cc/MBQ7-CG9E].
128
See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 127.
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opportunity to be heard.129 The individual must be notified that
he or she will soon be deprived of a right he or she is entitled to,
and the individual must be allowed the opportunity to dispute
the deprivation.130 Due to a lack of notice as well as a lack of an
opportunity to be heard, the NYPD’s gang database lacks
Procedural Due Process.131 “The essential due process question is
whether the marginal benefit of introducing additional
procedures to eliminate errors and protect the liberty interests
involved exceeds the marginal cost of introducing these
procedures with the possible effect of sacrificing some of the
impact they may have had in deterring gang crime.”132 When
evaluating Procedural Due Process claims, the court does a
balancing test between the private interest, risk of erroneous
deprivation, the costs of additional safeguards, and the
government interest.133
In the case of the NYPD’s gang database, when an individual
requests to learn whether he or she is in the database through
the Freedom of Information Act, his or her request is often
denied.134
The documentation process requires very little
participation by the individual, diminishing the opportunity to
prevent erroneous entry.135 There is currently no procedure in
place or opportunity for an individual to request that his or her
name is removed from the gang database.136 And, despite the
NYPD’s claim, there are significant consequences associated with
being in the NYPD’s gang database.137 For all of these reasons,
the NYPD’s gang database currently violates the 14th
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. To illustrate the extent of
this constitutional violation, the next section analyzes the
protected interest at risk and evaluates the reality of adding
procedural safeguards through a Mathews analysis.

129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

JUSTIA, supra note 48.
Id.
See supra Section I.C.
Wright, supra note 19, at 131.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
See supra Section I.C.
Howell, supra note 14, at 16; see also supra Section I.C.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section I.D.
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The NYPD’s Gang Database Infringes Upon A Protected
Interest

The Due Process Clause is designed to prevent deprivation of
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”138 Being
placed in the database increases surveillance by the police,139
increases the possibility of being swept in a NYPD gang raid,140
and can lead to inexplicably harsh charges or excessive bail,141
among the other things previously mentioned. Placement in the
NYPD’s gang database does not implicate reputation alone.142
Rather, it creates a reputation that increases harassment, hyperpolicing, and possible deportation, as well as increases the
likelihood of loss of employment and public housing and being
subjected to the criminal justice system.143
When
evaluating
procedural
due
process,
“[t]he
constitutional issue . . . turns upon whether documentation
significantly alters an individual’s status as a matter of state law
or merely causes stigma to reputation.”144 The Supreme Court in
Paul v. Davis explained:
The words “liberty” and “property” as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment do not in terms single out reputation as a
candidate for special protection over and above other interests
that may be protected by state law. While we have in a number
of our prior cases pointed out the frequently drastic effect of the
“stigma” which may result from defamation by the government
in a variety of contexts, this line of cases does not establish the
proposition that reputation alone, apart from some more tangible
interests such as employment, is either “liberty” or “property” by
itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due
Process Clause.145

Being labeled as a “gang member” in New York City alters an
individual’s status within New York City’s criminal justice,
employment, public housing, and immigration systems.
“Immigration authorities use the label to justify deportation.
Prosecutors use it to ask for higher bail and to keep people on
Rikers Island before they have been convicted. Judges consider
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
TRUJILLO & VITALE, supra note 55, at 13.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 15–18.
See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708–09 (1976).
TRUJILLO & VITALE, supra note 55, at 13–21.
Wright, supra note 19, at 133.
Davis, 424 U.S. at 701 (emphasis added).
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it when imposing sentences, even for nonviolent offenses.”146 The
NYPD documenting an individual as a suspected or known gang
member is enough to trigger some due process protections
because it can affect an individual’s entire livelihood.
Accordingly, there needs to be procedures in place to avoid
depriving potentially innocent people of rights vital to any
individual’s survival.
B.

The Mathews Analysis Weighs in Favor of Adding Procedural
Safeguards

When a cognizable interest is infringed upon, states must set
forth procedures that meet the Constitution’s due process
standard.147 The Supreme Court created the framework for this
analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge. Under Mathews, courts must
balance (1) the private interest affected by the official action;
(2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the
procedures used and the probable value of additional safeguards;
and (3) the government’s interest and any administrative
burdens that additional procedural safeguards would pose.148
The Mathews analysis here favors increasing procedural
safeguards for individuals placed in the NYPD’s gang database.
1.

The Private Interest

The private interest affected by the official action is the
property interest previously discussed. It’s an interest against
criminal mislabeling that can affect an individual’s livelihood.
New Yorkers have a legitimate private interest in not being
falsely labeled as gang members. There is an interest in keeping
this information from being used by immigration authorities for
deportation purposes.149 There is an interest in not wanting a
false label of being a gang member to affect an individual’s
bail.150 There is an interest in not wanting that false label to be
considered by employment or housing agencies.151 Moreover,
placement in the NYPD’s gang database is not idiosyncratic. It is
not a one-time event. The effects of being placed in the database
will continue until an individual is purged from the database,
146
147
148
149
150
151

Toure, supra note 15.
See Wright, supra note 19, at 137.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
See TRUJILLO &VITALE, supra note 55, at 20–21.
See id. at 15–16.
Id. at 18–20.
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and that is if that individual will even be purged from the
database. An individual could potentially remain in the NYPD’s
gang database for the duration of his or her life, and his or her
livelihood could be affected for the duration of his or her life.
That is why there is a significant private interest here. The
Supreme Court has “frequently recognized the severity of
depriving a person of the means of livelihood.”152 Placement in
the NYPD’s gang database can potentially affect one’s housing,
job, immigration status, and freedom.
2.

Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

Under the second prong of the Mathews analysis, both the
current and suggested procedural safeguards must be
A court must balance the risk of erroneous
evaluated.153
deprivation present in the NYPD’s current procedures against
the probable value of additional safeguards.154 Beginning with
the risk of erroneous deprivation, the NYPD’s gang database has
been described as a “secret” list by critics. In fact,
[t]he NYPD is facing increasing backlash over a lack of
transparency about the process by which it determines who is
included in its gang database, as well as its gang policing tactics
amid concerns over inaccurate labeling of youth—especially
youth of color—as gang members based on vague criteria.155

It is argued “that the risk of such consequences being thrust
upon innocent individuals is ‘too great’ when information about
how and why people are labeled gang members is withheld from
the public.”156
The NYPD has sought to minimize erroneous deprivation by
articulating two paths to inclusion in the gang database.
However, despite the articulation of these paths, there still exists
a high probability of erroneous entries. According to the NYPD:
The first path requires that one of the following take[s] place: a
self-admission of gang membership to a member of the NYPD,
being identified as a gang member by two “independent and
reliable sources” or social media posts admitting to membership
in a gang.

152

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985).
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
154
Id.
155
Toure, supra note 15.
156
Id. (emphasis added) (describing arguments made by Councilman Donovan
Richards).
153
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The second path . . . requires two of the following to be
true: frequent presence at a known gang location; possession of
“gang-related documents”; association with known gang
members; social media posts with known gang members while
possessing known gang paraphernalia; scars and tattoos
associated with a particular gang; frequent wearing of the colors
and frequent use of hand signs linked to specific gangs.157

Aside from the individuals who “self-identify” as gang members,
there is no participation from the individual in the
documentation process.
Lack of participation from the
individual, in general, increases the likelihood of erroneous entry
into the database. This is because placement in the gang
database is based on what the NYPD thinks it knows from social
media, outside sources, or the everyday “behavior” of the
individual in question.158
Due to the lack of transparency, lack of participation from
the individual, and extreme discretion afforded to the NYPD,
there is a high risk that a New Yorker will be erroneously added
to the gang database. The individual would potentially be
subjected to the loss of housing, jobs, immigration status, and
freedom without any notice or any opportunity to be heard.159
The analysis does not end there. “The Mathews balancing
analysis requires one to consider not only the risk of erroneous
deprivation, which is very high, but also the ‘probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.’ ”160 One
way to describe the cost-benefit analysis when adding procedural
safeguards is as:
“Increase in Accuracy X Claimant’s Interest > Burden on
Government.”161

157

Id.
Id.
159
The ability to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard are feasible
procedural safeguards. As discussed in Part IV of this Note, California has
successfully implemented both a notice requirement and procedures for hearings
regarding an individual’s placement in its CalGang database. See infra Part IV.
Additionally, Illinois’ Inspector General has suggested notice and an opportunity to
be heard to improve some of the issues with Chicago’s gang database. CITY OF
CHICAGO OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF THE CHICAGO POLICE
DEPARTMENT’S
“GANG
DATABASE”,
3
(2019),
https://igchicago.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/OIG-CPD-Gang-Database-Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PBT4-6NUA].
160
Wright, supra note 19, at 138 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976)).
161
Id. at 139.
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As discussed above, the probability of risk of erroneous
deprivation is quite high and the private liberty interest at risk is
significant.162 These risks together must be weighed against the
costs of additional procedures. “[T]he complete absence of
procedural safeguards in the documentation process and input
from the affected party suggests that additional safeguards
would have a dramatic effect on the accuracy of the gang
database.”163
Safeguards, such as providing notice to individuals and
offering them the opportunity to be heard and challenge their
designation as an alleged gang member, would substantially
improve the accuracy of the NYPD’s gang database. It would
allow innocent people to purge themselves from the database,
instead of relying on NYPD officials to do it. This is not a trivial
or marginal benefit. It is a simple and voluntary means of
protecting the liberty of those who rightfully should not be in the
gang database. It would also help to increase the community’s
faith in the NYPD’s gang database because it affords greater
transparency. For all of the above reasons, the probable value of
requiring notice and the opportunity to be heard is significant.
Together, this prong of the Mathews analysis weighs in favor of
an increase in procedural safeguards.
3.

The Government’s Interest

The next step in the analysis is to determine the burden that
would be imposed on the NYPD if more procedural safeguards
were required.
Mathews requires that courts weigh the
government’s interest in the current procedures.164 The calculus
of the government’s interest “must account for the administrative
burden associated with adding a particular procedure.”165 It
follows logically to begin with the NYPD’s interest in their gang
database in general, and how further procedural safeguards
would affect that interest. Here, the NYPD does have some
legitimate interest in its current procedures. According to the
NYPD, the gang database “is a ‘precision policing’ tool, focused on

162

See supra Sections III.A, III.B.1.
Wright, supra note 19, at 139; cf. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18,
32–33 (1981) (determining that there was no error when the trial court failed to
appoint counsel for the mother, because the mother did not show much interest in
obtaining custody of her son).
164
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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Wright, supra note 19, at 139.
163

2020]

GANG DATABASES

1055

‘finding and arresting the few who weaken the fabric of our
The
neighborhoods through violence and intimidation.’ ”166
NYPD’s “goal is to make sure that everyone who is in the
database is actually a gang member,” and the NYPD
acknowledged that “[s]aturating the database with non-gang
members limits its usefulness.”167 The NYPD has also argued
that, “telling young people they are thought to be affiliated with
a gang would hamper investigations.”168
The NYPD has legitimate interests in decreasing
neighborhood violence and in not wanting to have their
investigations “hampered.”
However, imposing procedural
protections would hardly impose upon these interests.
“Whatever impact gang databases have on crime rates, a hearing
requirement would not compromise the [agency’s] ability to share
information, analyze the data to inform their resource allocation
decisions, and facilitate prosecution by presenting the data in
court.”169 Requiring that the NYPD give notice and provide an
opportunity to be heard does not infringe on their interest in
reducing crime. It would likely help the NYPD maintain an
accurate gang database—one of its stated goals.
The Supreme Court has held that when the risk of
deprivation of a protected interest is “unacceptably high,” the
government must provide the individual with “notice of the
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut
[those] factual assertions.”170 In this case, while requiring notice
and a hearing may increase the NYPD’s administrative costs,
these changes are practical, feasible, and constitutionally
mandated. Increased administrative costs do not outweigh the
liberty interest risks posed by the gang database in its current
implementation.
Whatever costs may be associated with
providing notice and an opportunity to be heard, they are
minimal compared to the risks of loss of housing, jobs,
immigration status, and freedom.171 Moreover, these procedural
safeguards would promote the NYPD’s stated goals of the gang
database. It would make it more precise and, therefore, more
166
Pinto, supra note 62 (quoting Oleg Chernyavsky, the Head of Legislative
Affairs for the NYPD).
167
Toure, supra note 15 (quoting Dermot Shea, the NYPD’s Chief of Detectives).
168
Pinto, supra note 62.
169
Wright, supra note 19, at 139; see infra Part IV for discussion of the ideal
hearing requirement.
170
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532–533 (2004).
171
See TRUJILLO AND VITALE, supra note 55, at 13–21.
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useful. Thus, the Mathews test weighs in favor of the NYPD
providing notice and the opportunity to be heard.
IV. THE GANG DATABASE SHOULD BE CONTROLLED BY STATUTE
The Inspector General should do a full investigation, and,
following that investigation, the gang database should be
regulated by statute. The statute should reflect the findings of
the investigation and focus on correcting the current
constitutional errors that exist with the current database. After
the NYPD’s Inspector General conducts an investigation and
discloses his findings, New York should implement a statute
similar to the one implemented in California. There are four key
components in California’s Fair and Accurate Gang Database Act
of 2017172 that should be included in any New York City
legislation concerning the NYPD’s gang database: (1) all criteria
and relevant definitions concerning gangs are written within the
act; (2) the act confers oversight power to the California
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to deter abuse of discretion;
(3) the act mandates a notice requirement; and (4) the act
includes a means of challenging one’s inclusion on the
database.173 Each is discussed below.
First, all criteria and relevant definitions concerning gangs
should be written within any legislation developed for the
NYPD’s gang database. California’s Fair and Accurate Gang
Database Act lists and defines the terms “criminal street
gang,”174 “gang database,”175 “law enforcement agency,”176 and
172

Fair and Accurate Gang Database Act of 2017, Cal. Assemb. B. 90, Chap 695
(Cal. 2017).
173
Id.
174
“Criminal street gang” is defined as “an ongoing organization, association, or
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its
primary activities the commission of crimes . . . who have a common identifying sign,
symbol, or name, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of definable criminal activity.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.34(a)(1)
(West 2018).
175
“Gang database” is defined as “any database accessed by a law enforcement
agency that designates a person as a gang member or associate, or includes or points
to information, including, but not limited to, fact-based or uncorroborated
information, that reflects a designation of that person as a gang member or
associate.” Id. § 186.34(a)(2).
176
“Law enforcement agency” is defined as
a governmental agency or a subunit of a governmental agency, and its
authorized support staff and contractors, whose primary function is
detection, investigation, or apprehension of criminal offenders, or whose
primary duties include detention, pretrial release, posttrial release,
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“shared gang database.”177 Currently, only “gang” is publicly
defined by the NYPD.178 Any legislation pursuant to the NYPD’s
gang database should include these definitions to alleviate some
of the transparency issues that it currently suffers from. The
public would have notice about who the NYPD is targeting.
Second, any legislation regarding the NYPD’s gang database
should confer oversight to outside agencies. Oversight should be
defined as regulatory supervision to maintain the database and
prevent any abuse of discretion. California’s Fair and Accurate
Gang Database Act requires the California DOJ to administer
and oversee CalGang.179 The DOJ “may enforce a violation of
state, federal or regulation with respect to a shared gang
database or a regulation, policy, or procedure established by the
department . . . .”180 Previously, the CalGang Executive Board
administered and oversaw the CalGang database, similar to the
way the NYPD currently administers and oversees the NYPD
gang database.181 Now, the California DOJ governs the use of the
CalGang database.182
In addition to giving the DOJ administration and oversight
power, the Attorney General established the Gang Database
Technical Advisory Committee (“GDTAC”) “to advise the
department in promulgating regulations governing the use,
operation, and oversight of shared gang databases.”183 It is the
committee’s job to provide advice to the DOJ on standardized
training.184 The GDTAC has one main goal: to build consensus
and provide “the public a seat at the table.”185 Under the DOJ

correctional supervision, or the collection, storage, or dissemination of
criminal history record information.
Id. § 186.34(a)(3).
177
“Shared gang database” is defined as “a gang database that is accessed by an
agency or person outside of the agency that created the records that populate the
database.” Id. § 186.34(a)(4).
178
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
179
CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.36 (West 2018).
180
Id. § 186.36(u).
181
Id. § 186.36(b).
182
Id.
183
Office of the Attorney General, Gang Database Technical Advisory
Committee:
CalGang
and
Shared
Database
Regulations,
CALGANG,
https://oag.ca.gov/calgang/gdtac [https://perma.cc/V8VR-K5W8] (last visited June 22,
2021).
184
CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.36(o) (West 2018).
185
Dep’t of Just., AB 90 Overview & Committee Goals and Objectives,
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/calgang/ab90-overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VYN3-65RU] (last visited June 22, 2021).
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and GDTAC, there are outside individuals responsible for
regulating CalGang, there are departments outside of police
departments with oversight over CalGang, and there is an
opportunity for public involvement.186 There should be similar
oversight required by the NYPD. It would function to help
prevent corruption, abuse of discretion, or intentional racial
targeting done in connection with the NYPD’s gang database.
Oversight would help provide accountability and potentially
increase some of the community’s faith in the database.
Third, any legislation regarding the NYPD’s gang database
should require that notice be provided to those entered into the
database. Under California’s Fair and Accurate Gang Database
Act, notice “shall describe the process for the person . . . to
contest the designation of the person in the database. The notice
shall also inform the person of the reason for his or her
designation in the database.”187 The notice requirement is
nothing more than a letter that tells the person why they are a
suspected gang member and how they can challenge their
inclusion in CalGang. It is simple and procedurally effective.
Like CalGang, the NYPD’s gang database should include a notice
requirement as well. It is recognized that the NYPD has
concerns about including a notice requirement because notice
may “harm” ongoing investigations. One way to alleviate this
concern would be to modify the notification requirement so that
notice is always required “unless providing that notification
would compromise an active criminal investigation or
compromise the health or safety of the minor.”188 Including this
short provision protects both sides’ interests and goals.
Lastly, there should be an opportunity to be heard. As
indicated in the notice requirement, CalGang affords a process
for challenging an individual’s placement in CalGang:
[T]he person designated or to be designated as a suspected gang
member, associate, or affiliate . . . may submit written
documentation to the local law enforcement agency contesting
the designation. The local law enforcement agency shall review
the documentation, and if the agency determines that the
person is not a suspected gang member . . . the agency shall
remove the person from the shared gang database. The local
law enforcement agency shall provide the person . . . with
186
187
188

Office of the Attorney General, supra note 183.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.34(c)(2) (West 2018).
Id. § 186.34(c)(1).
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written verification of the agency’s decision within 30 days of
submission of the written documentation contesting the
designation. If the law enforcement agency denies the request
for removal, the notice of its determination shall state the
reason for the denial. If the law enforcement agency does not
provide a verification of the agency’s decision within the
required 30-day period, the request to remove the person from
the gang database shall be deemed denied. The person . . . may
petition the court to review the law enforcement agency’s denial
of the request for removal and order the law enforcement
agency to remove the person from the shared gang
database . . . .189

The statute outlines the individual’s ability to provide written
objection to the inclusion, and if that is denied, provides the
opportunity to be heard in court to challenge their placement in
the database.190 If applied to New York, this would give
individuals ample opportunity to purge themselves out of the
gang database. Together with the notice requirement, this will
alleviate many of the critiques on transparency issues and help
to achieve a more accurate gang database by limiting erroneous
entries.
CONCLUSION
The NYPD’s gang database has two significant issues. The
first issue is that the database may be a vehicle for racial
profiling. The second issue is that it lacks the proper procedures
to prevent individuals from being unconstitutionally deprived of
property interests. If the database is being used as a tool for
racial profiling, it is unconstitutional under the 14th
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The correct remedy
would be to abolish the database until the NYPD can maintain it
189

Id. § 186.34(e).
Law enforcement is required to prove that the individual is an active gang
member by “clear and convincing evidence.” Should law enforcement fail to meet
their burden, the individual should be removed from the gang database. Kelly Davis,
Few People Have Successfully Removed Themselves from State Gang Database,
VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/publicsafety/few-people-have-successfully-removed-themselves-from-state-gang-database/
[https://perma.cc/8LEJ-HL8B]. In 2017, there were 16 requests for removal made to
law enforcement agencies but only one was granted. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT ON CALGANG FOR 2017, 1, 2 (2017),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/calgang/ag-annual-report-calgang2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3K2-NB4Z]. In 2018, there were 53 requests made and
11 of them were granted. Id.
190
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in a way that is actually race-neutral. However, intent of racial
discrimination is difficult to prove, and, therefore, Equal
Protection violations are difficult to prove. While the racial
discrepancy of the database—with 98% of those included being
Black and/or Latinx—is stark, it is not enough by itself to prove
discriminatory intent. Although the NYPD does have a history of
racial profiling, without more evidence of the NYPD’s current
intent to target only Black and/or Latinx individuals in New
York City, a challenge to their gang database on Equal
Protection grounds is unlikely to succeed.
If the NYPD is going to continue to maintain its gang
database, there needs to be reforms. First, the NYPD’s Inspector
General should conduct a full investigation of the NYPD’s gang
database. The Inspector General should review the NYPD’s
policies on gangs, observe NYPD gang trainings, interview NYPD
personnel regarding gang policies and the gang database,
analyze the NYPD’s gang-related data and reports, and examine
external agencies’ access to the NYPD’s gang database.
Following the full investigation, the Inspector General should
create a report and disclose his findings to the public. Based on
the findings made by the Inspector General, the NYPD’s gang
database should be controlled by statute. Its statute should
mirror that of California’s and contain provisions that define all
relevant terms and list the criteria for being placed in the
database, confer the power of oversight to an outside
governmental agency, provide automatic notice of inclusion in
the database, and provide a method of challenging one’s inclusion
in the database. With these proposed changes, the NYPD could
have a constitutionally sound database that achieves its goal of
precision policing.

